


















Douglas Walton, Giovanni Sartor and Fabrizio Macagno
1 Introduction0
Interpretation is regarded as the passage from a legal text to a legal rule (Hage 1996,1
214; Tarello 1980), namely a normative premise under which an individual case2
is “subsumed” or classified (see Moreso and Chilovi, chapter 2, part III, this vol-3
ume, on “Interpretive Arguments and the Application of the Law”). This passage4
can be compared to the common understanding and processing of utterances in ordi-5
nary conversation (Smolka and Pirker 2016), in which semantic content is only a6
vehicle for getting to the “speaker’s meaning” or what is communicated—a richer7
content “to which meaning and obvious background assumptions have both con-8
tributed” (Soames 2008, 411; see also Butler 2016; Carston 2013; Horn 1995; Miller9
1990). Legal interpretation does not differ essentially from ordinary interpretation,10
even though legislative speech is one-sided (there is nobody who can immediately11
answer back) and the basic presumption governing such texts is that the author used12
the language to convey ideas (Sinclair 1985, 390). However, pragmatic principles13
constitute a dimension of rationality which is necessary for the understanding of14
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520 F. Macagno et al.
legal texts (Sinclair 1985, 401). As Soames puts it, the statutory language provides15
incomplete semantic content, which needs to be completed by pragmatic (contextual)16
factors and processes:17
Just as what I say, and commit myself to, by uttering a sentence, is often a function of18
more than its semantic content, so “what the law says,” and is committed to, is often a19
function of more than the semantic contents of relevant legal texts. Just as you have no20
standing to reinterpret my remark to conform to your moral and political views, simply21
because the meaning of my sentence doesn’t fully determine the content of my remark, so22
judges applying the law have no standing to reinterpret it, simply because the linguistic23
meanings of the relevant legal texts don’t fully determine the content of the law. There are24
other principles at work filling the gap between sentence meanings and the contents of texts,25
legal or otherwise (Soames 2008, 404).26
In pragmatics, the reconstruction of meaning in ordinary conversation is regarded27
as characterized by both default reasoning and systematic and critical inferences28
(Jaszczolt 2005, 46; Wilson 2005). Default inferences are triggered when informa-29
tion about the current context is absent or not necessary for comprehension (i.e., when30
the inferential conclusion is not in conflict with the present context). When default31
inferences cannot be drawn (Kecskes 2008, 2013, 129, 131; Kecskes and Zhang32
2009), more complex inferences need to be made. In legal theory, this twofold pro-33
cess is mirrored by the concepts of understanding and interpretation. Interpretation34
is defined as “an ascription of meaning to a linguistic sign in the case its meaning is35
doubtful in a communicative situation, i.e., in the case its “direct understanding” is36
not sufficient for the communicative purpose at hand” (Dascal andWróblewski 1988,37
204). In case there is an “eventual ‘mismatch’ between the ‘computed’ utterance-38
meaning and some contextual factor” resulting from the background or the specific39
case to which the law is applied (Dascal and Wróblewski 1988, 213, 216), interpre-40
tation needs to be justified through reasons (Atlas 2008; Atlas and Levinson 1981;41
Dascal 2003, 635).42
This chapter addresses the problem of representing and assessing the reasons pro-43
vided in favor of a specific interpretation and more precisely justifying why and how44
an interpretation is more acceptable than others (Macagno 2017). At this functional45
level, such interpretive reasons are regarded as arguments (Macagno and Capone46
2016) aimed at showing why a particular rule, rather than another, is valid on the47
basis of the statutory text (Hage 1996, 215). In statutory interpretation, such argu-48
ments are usually analyzed using specific maxims of interpretation, which can be49
translated into a formal language (Hage 1997). In this chapter, we will show how the50
canons of interpretation can be represented as schemes, namely patterns of defea-51
sible argument advanced in support of the interpretation of a text (or part thereof).52
This formalization can be then used to bridge the gap between legal interpretation53
and argumentation theory, and more specifically the argumentation schemes used for54
representing and evaluating natural arguments (Macagno and Walton 2015; Walton55
et al. 2008).56
The functional analysis of legal interpretation in terms of arguments and the57
formalization of the interpretive arguments as schemes (advanced in Sects. 258
and 3) allows modeling legal interpretation combining the formal argumentation59


























Statutory Interpretation as Argumentation 521
system ASPIC+ with a logical language (Sartor et al. 2014). After introducing the60
Carneades Argumentation System (Sect. 4) and applying it to two cases (Sects. 561
and 6), Sects. 7–10 will be devoted to developing a logical model for reasoning62
with interpretive canons, conceived as defeasible rules (see Sartor, chapter 3,63
part II, this volume, on “Defeasibility in Law”). The logical structure that will be64
developed will not be framed in deontic terms, but rather will concern terminological65
assertions concerning what should count as the best interpretations of the contested66
or potentially contested expressions.67
2 Interpretive Arguments68
The justification of an interpretation can be regarded as an argumentation-based69
procedure in which the best interpretation is the one supported by the strongest or70
less defeasible arguments (Atlas and Levinson 1981; Macagno et al. 2018). On this71
perspective, the “canons” or maxims of interpretation can be reframed as arguments72
(Macagno and Walton 2017), which can be classified according to their commu-73
nicative purpose and the types of warrants. This classification allows detecting the74
relationship between interpretive canons and the schemes commonly used in argu-75
mentation theory.76
2.1 The Existing Types of Interpretive Arguments77
Macagno et al. (2012) compiled a list of eleven interpretive arguments identified by78
MacCormick and Summers (1991). Below, each type of argument recognized in that79
prior list is explained in a condensed manner to give the readers some idea of how80
each of them can be reconfigured as a distinct defeasible form of argument.81
• Argument from ordinary meaning requires that a term should be interpreted accord-82
ing to the meaning that a native speaker would ascribe to it.83
• Argument from technical meaning requires that a term having a technical meaning84
and occurring in a technical context should be interpreted in its technical meaning.85
• Argument from contextual harmonization requires that a term included in a statute86
or set of statutes should be interpreted in line with whole statute or set.87
• Argument from precedent requires that a term should be interpreted in a way that88
fits previous judicial interpretations.89
• Argument from statutory analogy requires that a term should be interpreted in90
a way that preserves the similarity of meaning with similar provisions of other91
statutes.92
• Argument from a legal concept requires that a term should be interpreted in line93
with the way it has been previously recognized and doctrinally elaborated in law.94
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• Argument from general principles requires that a term should be interpreted in a95
way that is most in conformity with general legal principles already established.96
• Argument from history requires that a term should be interpreted in line with the97
historically evolved understanding of it.98
• Argument from purpose requires that a term should be interpreted in a way that99
fits a purpose that can be ascribed to the statutory provision, or whole statute, in100
which the term occurs.101
• Argument from substantive reasons requires that a term should be interpreted in102
line with a goal that is fundamentally important to the legal order.103
• Argument from intention requires that a term should be interpreted in line with the104
intention of the legislative authority.105
These eleven types of interpretive argument are comparable to and overlap with106
the fourteen types previously identified by Tarello (1980, Chap. 8), listed as follows107
in Sartor et al. (2014):108
• Arguments a contrario rejects interpretations of a term departing from the term’s109
literal meaning.110
• Analogical arguments support interpretations according to which the meaning of111
a term or expression of a legal provision is extended to apply a rule to a case not112
regulated by the given provision (it is included in neither the core nor the periphery113
of its application area), but presenting a relevant similarity with the cases covered114
by it (Damele 2014; Gray 2013, 35).115
• Arguments a fortiori support interpretations according to which the meaning of a116
term or expression in a legal provision is extended to apply that provision a case117
that is not regulated by such a provision (it is included in neither the core nor the118
periphery of the application area of the provision in question), but deserves, to a119
higher degree, the same discipline as the cases covered by it.120
• Arguments from completeness of the legal regulation exclude interpretations that121
create legal gaps.122
• Arguments from the coherence of the legal regulation exclude interpretations of123
different legal statements that make them conflicting.124
• Psychological arguments support interpretations driven by the actual intent of the125
authors of legal text.126
• Historical arguments support interpretations giving a legal statement the same127
meaning that was traditionally attributed to other statements governing the same128
matter.129
• Apagogical arguments exclude interpretations that generate absurdities.130
• Teleological arguments support interpretations contributing to it a purpose per-131
taining to the goals or interests that the law is supposed to promote.132
• Non-redundancy arguments exclude interpretations that would make the inter-133
preted expression redundant, under the assumption that the legislator does not134
make useless normative statements.135
• Authoritative arguments support interpretations already given by authoritative136
courts or scholars.137


























Statutory Interpretation as Argumentation 523
• Naturalistic arguments support interpretations aligning a legal statement to human138
nature or the nature of the matter regulated by that statement.139
• Arguments from equity support (exclude) (un)fair or (un)just interpretations.140
• Arguments from general principles support (exclude) interpretations that are sup-141
ported by (incompatible with) general principles of the legal system.142
The two lists complement each other, even though Tarello’s list emphasizes the143
kinds of input on which interpretive argument is based, such as ordinary language,144
technical language, and so forth, while MacCormick and Summers’ list emphasizes145
the reasoning steps involved in the interpretive process.146
In comparing the two lists of types of interpretive arguments, some common147
elements stand out, but there are also significant differences. Some of the argu-148
ment types in the Tarello’s list—such as analogical arguments, teleological argu-149
ments, and arguments from general principles—appear to be already included in150
the list of MacCormick and Summers. Tarello’s psychological arguments seem to151
fit under McCormick and Summers’ category of argument from intention. It looks152
like Tarello’s authoritative arguments might fit under MacCormick and Summers’153
category of argument from precedent. Others types of argument are distinctively154
different, while in still other cases it is unclear how the type of interpretive argument155
described in the one list is related to the type described in the other list.156
One of the crucial problems concerning types of interpretive arguments is their157
use (in training legal practitioners or scholars) and their relations with the works in158
argumentation theory and logic on argument analysis and reconstruction. Recently,159
the canons or maxims that express the general principle characterizing each type of160
argument have been represented as defeasible rules, to be integrated within a pri-161
oritized defeasible logic system (Rotolo et al. 2015). The purpose of this chapter is162
to analyze types of interpretive arguments as argumentation schemes, or rather dia-163
logical patterns of arguments, in which an interpretation is regarded as a defeasible164
viewpoint that needs to be supported by a pattern of reasoning and can be subject165
to default in case specific critical questions are successfully advanced. On this per-166
spective, interpretive reasoning is framed within a broader dialectical framework,167
involving a specific burden of bearing out and defeating a specific interpretation168
(Gizbert-Studnicki 1990).169
Some of the interpretive argumentation schemes in both lists clearly relate to170
argumentation schemes already widely known and studied in argumentation that are171
not specifically designed to deal with interpretive issues (Macagno andWalton 2015;172
Walton et al. 2008). Hence, there are many questions about how some of the new173
interpretive schemes relate to these more general schemes that have been already174
widely recognized. For example, the category of authoritative arguments in Tarello’s175
list might relate to scheme for argument from expert opinion. Since laws formulated176
in statutes are binding on the courts, it can be said that the statement made in this177
context can be held to hold by reason of authority. But a legal scheme for argument178
from administrative authority that is a variant on argument from authority already has179
some recognition in the field of argumentation studies. Hence, there are questions180
raised about how this new interpretive scheme proposed by Tarello distinguishes181
between the two kinds of argument from authority. As mentioned above, there is182
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also the question of how Tarello’s version of interpretive argument from authority183
fits in with schemes from MacCormick and Summers’ list such as argument from184
precedent, argument from a legal concept, argument from general principles, and185
argument from history. None of these questions can be discussed in this chapter,186
for reasons of length, but they need to be recognized here as problems for future187
research.188
Another similar problem is how the interpretive argument from precedent, as it189
is called in MacCormick and Summers’ list, is related to the general scheme for190
argument from precedent, already recognized in the argumentation literature. The191
problem is that there are great divisions of opinion on precisely how the scheme192
should be modeled. Many think that argument from precedent is always based on193
argument from analogy, that is, on a comparison between and source case and a target194
case. But others might think that legal argument from precedent needs to be based195
on ratio decidendi. Another question raised by this difference of opinion is whether196
ratio decidendi represents some kind of analogy between the two cases where the197
rationale used to arrive at the conclusion in the source case is supposed to be similar198
to a comparable rationale that can fit the target case.199
In this chapter, we recognize the existence of these problems without delving into200
a detailed analysis thereof, so that we can forge ahead with building a framework201
for interpretive argumentation schemes that can later be applied to studying specific202
schemes and issues. The starting point is to provide a general classification of the203
most important arguments of the two lists, identifying the more generic identities204
between them. Then, we move through a sequence of examples of legal arguments205
where interpretation of a statute or law is an issue, applying themodel to the examples.206
As always, the work of applying formal structures to real cases of argumentation in207
natural language discourse raises problems and difficulties in its own right.208
2.2 Classifying the Interpretive Arguments209
MacCormick (2005, 124–25) proposed that there are three main categories of210
interpretive argument, over the above eleven categories of interpretive arguments211
acknowledged as persuasive in grounding a selected interpretation of a text in a212
disputed case in a broad variety of legal systems. First, there are so-called linguis-213
tic arguments that appeal to the linguistic context itself to support an interpretation214
(which we can call definitional arguments, Macagno and Walton 2014). Second,215
there are the systemic arguments that take the special context of the authoritative216
text, within the legal system, into account. Such schemes merge the authority of the217
source with the reconstruction of the definition from the text. Third, there are the218
teleological–evaluative arguments that make sense of the text in light of its aim or219
goal (which we can refer to as pragmatic arguments, seeMacagno andWalton 2015).220
A fourth category is what McCormick (2005) calls “appeal to the lawmaker’s inten-221
tion.” McCormick does not consider this type of interpretive argument alongside222
the other main categories of interpretive argument, because of the ambiguity and223


























Statutory Interpretation as Argumentation 525
indeterminacy of the notion of intention. He rather views it a trans-categorical type224
of argument that ranges across all the other categories and their types, as linguis-225
tic, systemic or teleological–evaluative considerations can support the attribution of226
intentions to legislators.227
If we try to analyze the lists of arguments in terms of patterns of argument,228
explaining the arguments of legal interpretation using the categories of argumen-229
tation schemes, we need to draw a first crucial distinction between arguments that230
support an interpretation and arguments that reject an interpretation. Some interpre-231
tive canons, however, are bivalent, in the sense that they provide for two interpretive232
schemes: one (positive or negative) when the canon’s condition is satisfied, and233
the opposite (negative or positive) when the canon’s condition is not satisfied. For234
instance, while the contextual coherence of an interpretation supports the adoption235
of an interpretation, lack of contextual coherence supports rejection. In such cases,236
we use the symbol + and–to denote the use of a scheme to support and reject an237
interpretation, for instance + contextual coherence and -contextual coherence.238
The arguments supporting an interpretation are different in nature (Macagno239
2015). Pragmatic arguments, definitional arguments (of different types, including240
the systemic ones), and analogical arguments represent distinct reasoning patterns,241
which are often merged with authority arguments. Such arguments are intended to242
back up a specific definition based on previous interpretations (epistemic authority)243
or on the reconstruction of a possible “intention” of the lawmaker (deontic author-244
ity), or on the alleged “nature” of a concept (the commonly shared definition). Such245
categories often merge with each other, but they can be classified in Fig. 1 based on246
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Fig. 1 Classifying the arguments of interpretation
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It was recognized by MacCormick (2005) that there can be conflicts between248
interpretive arguments, pitting one form of interpretive argument against another249
(Rotolo et al. 2015). Some legal traditions provide general criteria for dealing with250
conflicts of this sort based on certain kinds of priorities. Alexy and Dreier (1991,251
95–8) have cited criteria such as the following: (a) In criminal law, arguments from252
ordinary meaning have priority over arguments from technical meaning; (b) in crim-253
inal law, generic arguments based on the intention of the legislator have priority over254
arguments not based on authority, but not over linguistic arguments. In this chapter,255
we will use argumentation tools to represent such conflicts and priorities.256
3 Translating Interpretive Arguments into Schemes257
The classification of interpretive arguments can be the starting point for translating258
the arguments (and canons or maxims) into formal (or rather, quasi-formal) schemes259
representing how a conclusion is supported by premises. In particular, we will pro-260
vide the schemes for the two general categories (positive versus negative) and the261
definition-based arguments (in particular, from ordinary and technical meaning).262
These schemes will be the ground for the further formal representations in Sects. 4,263
5 and 6 and the logical formalization in the remaining sections.264
3.1 Assumptions and Common Template265
Statutes are written in natural language. Our concern is with the interpretation of266
sentences expressed in natural language that are susceptible to differing interpreta-267
tions (Atlas 2005; Horn 1995). The major philosophical concern is how the notion268
of meaning is to be defined in relation to the task of finding the evidential basis269
for preferring one interpretation or another (Atlas 2005; Atlas and Levinson 1981;270
Dascal 2003, 635). In this chapter, we find it most highly suitable to adopt a prag-271
matic approach to meaning, namely to understand statutory meaning as the intention272
expressed through the legal text (Carston 2013), an approach that corresponds to the273
trans-category understanding of interpretation in McCormick (2005). The syntax274
representing the structure of a sentence, as well as the individual semantic meanings275
of each term contained in the sentence, are important. But over and above such fac-276
tors, it needs to be acknowledged that the meaning of the sentence composed of these277
elements, especially in the examples considered in this chapter, needs to be placed in278
the context of a broader text or corpus in which it is embedded. For example, the issue279
of whether a contested word should be taking it as expressing and ordinary meaning280
or a technical meaning is a dispute about whether the word can be interpreted the one281
way or the other in a special context of use. For these reasons, although we acknowl-282
edge the importance of semantics and syntax in matters of statutory interpretation,283
we need to study the notion of meaning in a broad manner to include not only these284
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aspects, but also the aspect of the placement of the sentence in a broader context of285
use in different kinds of discourse.286
From our perspective, making an interpretation consists in associating a linguistic287
occurrence and a meaning within a specific context and use, i.e., in claiming that a288
certain expression E in certain document D has a certain meaning M. Interpretations289
are not necessarily correct. They may be right or wrong, preferable or not to other290
interpretations.291
We shall model the application of interpretation canons by using a uniform tem-292
plate, so that for each canonweobtain an argument scheme including amajor premise,293
a minor premise, and an interpretive conclusion.294
• The major premise is a general canon: If interpreting an expression (word, phrase,295
sentence) in legal document (source, text, statute) in a certain way satisfies the296
condition of the canon issue, then the expression should/should not be interpreted297
(depending on whether the canon is a negative or positive one) in that way.298
• Theminor premise is a specific assertion: Interpreting an expression in a particular299
document in a certain way satisfies the condition of the canon.300
• The conclusion is a specific claim: The expression in that document indeed301
should/should not be interpreted in that way.302
In this chapter, we shall apply this template to provide schemes for the following303
canons: (1) argument from ordinary language (OL); (2) argument from technical304
language, whose requirement is correspondence to technical language (TL); (3) a305
contrario argument (AC); (4) argument from purpose (Pu); (5) argument from prece-306
dent (Pr); (6) argument from contextual harmonization (CH). This list of schemes307
will be added to as new schemes are formulated. + for schemes uses to argue for an308
interpretation. Here is our system of notation for labeling the nodes in an argument309
diagram to indicate a scheme. We use – for schemes used to argue against an inter-310
pretation, +e for exclusion, and +i for inclusion. Hence, we put +e as the use is in311
favor of exclusion (for the exclusionary conclusion). In Carneades, + indicates an312
argument in favor of its conclusion, so if the conclusion is exclusionary, it should be313
+e. So, for example, the notation +iPr labels a pro argument from inclusive argument314
from precedent.315
3.2 Positive Interpretive Schemes316
As mentioned above, two fundamental macro-categories of interpretive argument317
schemes need to be distinguished, the positive ones supporting an interpretation318
and the negative ones rejecting an interpretation. Here is the template for positive319
interpretive argument schemes. In presenting this template, we shall use uppercase320
letters for variables and lowercase letters for constants:321
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Major premise C: If the interpretation of E in a D as M satisfies C’s condition, then E in D
should be interpreted as M
Minor premise The interpretation of e in d as m satisfies C’s condition
Conclusion e in d should be interpreted as m
In applying this template, we need to substitute in the major premise the condition322
that characterizes a canon, for instance, fitting ordinary language (OL).323
In order to show how positive interpretive canons can be applied with this pattern,324
we use the case of Dunnachie v Kingston-upon-Hull City Council, also used by325
MacCormick (2005), as a running example. This case concerns an employee who326
claimed to have been unfairly dismissed, and as a result to have suffered humiliation,327
injury to feelings and distress. The employer argued that the relevant section of the328
current UK legislation, called the Employment Rights Act of 1996, only permits329
recovery of financial loss. The employee argued that a proper construction of all the330
relevant section of the statute allows for recovery of losses other than financial losses331
narrowly construed. The question posed was whether the term “loss,” as used in the332
statute, referred only to financial loss or could be given a more extended meaning so333
that it included losses such as emotional loss that are not strictly financial.334
If we use the canon Ordinary Language, we obtain the following structure:
Major premise OL: If The interpretation of E in D as M fits ordinary language, then E in D
should be interpreted as M
Minor premise The interpretation of “loss” in Employment Relations Act as PecuniaryLoss
fits ordinary language
Conclusion “loss” in the Employment Relations Act should be interpreted as
PecuniaryLoss
335
Note that we use inverted commas for linguistic occurrences (“loss”) and a single336
word, with capitalized initials for meanings (PecuniaryLoss).337
By substituting the conditions of the OL canon, with the requirement of other338
canons listed above it is possible to generate other interpretation schemes. For339
instance, we can obtain the following scheme for Technical Language (TL):
Major premise TL: If the interpretation of E in D as M fits technical language, then E in D
should be interpreted as M
Minor premise The interpretation of “loss” in the Employment Relations Act as
PecuniaryOrEmotionalLoss fits technical language
Conclusion “loss” in the Employment Relations Act should be interpreted as
PecuniaryOrEmotionalLoss
340
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Obviously, our interpretive schemes only provide the top-level step in the reason-341
ing that is needed to apply an interpretive canon. For supporting the application of a342
canon, we need to establish the minor premise of the corresponding scheme, namely343
to show that the interpretation we are proposing indeed satisfies the canon we are344
considering. This requires specific arguments, according to scheme being consid-345
ered. For instance, for establishing that interpretation “pecuniary loss” of expression346
“loss” in document Employment Relations Act fits canon ordinary language, we will347
have to establish, by providing adequate evidence, that this interpretationmatches the348
current linguistic usage. Thus, for instance, to support the application of the ordinary349
language canon, we would need an inference like the following:
Major premise If E is commonly understood as M, then the interpretation of E in D as M fits
ordinary language
Minor premise The “loss” is commonly understood as PecuniaryLoss
Conclusion The interpretation of “loss” in Employment Relations Act as PecuniaryLoss
fits ordinary language
350
Here, the minor premise is a substitution instance of the antecedent of the major351
premise.352
3.3 Negative Interpretive Schemes353
According to negative canons, if an interpretation meets the canon’s condition, then354
it is to be rejected.
Major premise C: If the interpretation of E in D as M satisfies condition of C’s canon, then E
in D should not be interpreted as M
Minor premise The interpretation of e in d as m satisfies condition of negative canon
Conclusion e in d should not be interpreted as m
355
The most common negative canon is the a contrario (AC), which rejects an inter-356
pretation which is over- or under-inclusive with regard to the usual semantic meaning357
of that expression, according to the idea that Ubi lex voluit, dixit; ubi noluit, tacuit358
(what the law wishes, it states, what the law does not want, it keeps silent upon). The359
a contrario canon can also be viewed as a counterfactual appeal to the intention of360
the legislator: If the legislator had meant to express a meaning that is different from361
the usual meaning (the semantic meaning) of the expression at issue, he would have362
used a different expression. Here is for instance an example of application of the a363
contrario canon.364
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Major premise AC: If the interpretation of E in D as M conflicts with the usual meaning of E
(is over or under-inclusive), then E in D should not be interpreted as M
Minor premise The interpretation of the expression “loss” in the Employment Relations as
PecuniaryOrEmotionalLoss conflicts with the usual meaning of “loss”
Conclusion “loss” in Employment Relations Act should not be interpreted as
PecuniaryOrEmotionalLoss
There is also a more specific kind of a contrario argument, which we may call365
subclass a contrario: Rather than rejecting an interpretation as a whole, it addresses366
the exclusion or inclusion of a certain subclass in the interpretation at issue, based on367
the fact that the subclass is included in or excluded from the usual meaning. Here are368
the two variants: the exclusionary a contrario (eAC) and the inclusionary a contrario369
(iAC). Note that the iAC has a positive interpretive conclusion, as the non-exclusion,370
i.e., the non–non-inclusion is an inclusion.371
Here is the first variant, namely the exclusionary a contrario argument.
Major premise eAC: If the interpretation of E in D as including S conflicts with the usual
meaning of E, then E in D should be interpreted as excluding S
Minor premise The interpretation of “loss” in the Employment Relations as including
EmotionalLoss conflicts with the usual meaning of “loss”
Conclusion “loss” in Employment Relations Act should be interpreted as excluding
EmotionalLoss
372
Here is the second variant, the inclusionary a contrario argument.
Major premise iAC: If the interpretation of E in D as excluding S conflicts with the usual
meaning of E, then E in D should be interpreted as including S
Minor premise The interpretation of “loss” in the Employment Relations as excluding
EmotionalLoss conflicts with the usual meaning of “loss”
Conclusion “loss” in Employment Relations Act should be interpreted as including
EmotionalLoss
373
The a contrario scheme can also be used in a meta-dialogical sense that concerns374
the choice of the scheme. A clear example is the following argument taken from375
R. v. Barnet London Borough Council (1 All ER 97, 2004):376
The words ‘ordinarily residing with’ are common English words and here there is no context377
requiring that they should be given other than their natural meaning in accordance with the378
accepted usage of English. Even in such circumstances, however, there can be difficulty and379
doubt as to their applicability to particular facts, because the conception to which the words380
have reference does not have a clearly definable content or fixed boundaries.381
The reasoning can be represented as follows, where mAC stands for meta-a con-382
trario.383
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Major premise mAC: If E in D is an ordinary English expression, and E in D has no context
requiring a technical meaning, then the technical language is inapplicable to
expression E in a document D
Minor premise 1 “Ordinarily residing with” in the Local Education Authority Awards
Regulations is an ordinary English expression
Minor premise 2 “Ordinarily residing with” in the Local Education Authority Awards
Regulations has no context requiring a technical meaning
Conclusion The technical language canon is inapplicable to expression “Ordinarily
residing with” in the Local Education Authority Awards
In this case, the absence of a context requiring a technical language (such as a384
definition, or the technical nature of the object of the regulation at issue) leads to the385
inapplicability of the technical language canon. This scheme is not a mere rebuttal386
(exclusion of a determinate meaning), but an undercutter (an attack to the grounds387
of an argument, in this case the possibility of using a major premise) (Pollock 1995;388
Walton 2015). Thus, the fact that the technical language argument cannot be used389
to support that interpretation does not exclude that the same interpretation can be390
successfully proposed through a different argument, such as the teleological one391
(argument from purpose).392
The meta-dialogical analysis of the a contrario argument raises two issues con-393
cerning its nature. The first one is the relationship between the exclusion of alterna-394
tive canons of interpretations and the idea of default. According to Alexy and Dreier395
(1991, 95–8), the ordinary language scheme should be taken as the default setting.396
The general principle at work here is the following conditional: Any expression in a397
legislative document should be interpreted using ordinary language, unless there are398
superior reasons to interpret the expression as fitting one of the other ten schemes.399
However, all interpretive canons are defaults. The difference here is that for any400
expression we can raise the defeasible claim that it should be interpreted according401
to its ordinary language meaning, while claims based on other canons can only be402
raised under specific conditions (e.g., a technical context is required to substantiate403
the claim that a term should be interpreted in a technical meaning).404
The second controversial issue about the a contrario argument is whether it ought405
to be treated only as an argumentation scheme or also as a meta-level principle that406
can be applied in conjunction with interpretive argumentation schemes. Argument407
from ignorance has traditionally been treated as an argumentation scheme in logic408
(Macagno and Walton 2011; Walton 1995), whereas the closed world assumption409
has been treated in AI as a meta-level principle rather than as a specific form of410
argument in its own right (Reiter 1980). The a contrario argument is similar to the411
argument from lack of evidence as it supports an inference from a negative finding412
to a positive conclusion.413
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4 Attacking, Questioning, and Defending Interpretive414
Arguments415
Since the basic defeasible schemes share a general pattern for interpretive arguments,416
there is no need to formulate critical questions for each of these schemes individually.417
The critical questions for each of them follow the general pattern indicated by the418
three critical questions presented below.419
(CQ1) What alternative interpretations of E in D should be considered?420
(CQ2) What reasons are there for rejecting alternative explanations?421
(CQ3)What reasons are there for accepting alternative explanations as better than (or equally422
good as) the one selected?423
The function of the critical questions is to help someone dealing with interpretive424
issues to probe into an interpretive argument in order to get an initial idea of what425
some of the weak points and it might be. They have a heuristic function of suggesting426
to an arguer who is at a loss on how to respond by suggesting possible avenues of427
attack. In this instance, the CQs are not independent of each other, and they have an428
ordering. CQ1 should be asked first.429
The way we will analyze interpretive arguments, as well as critical questions430
matching them and counterarguments attacking them, is to build an argumentation431
treewhich includes a contested interpretive argument and provides an analysis of how432
the chains of argumentation on both sides of the dispute connect with each other and433
to the ultimate claim at issue. This can be done using tools from formal argumentation434
systems such as the Carneades Argumentation System (Carneades) or the ASPIC+435
system.BothASPIC+ andCASare based on a logical language comprising both strict436
and defeasible inference rules that can be used to build arguments, and both systems437
use argumentation schemes. Sartor et al. (2014) have applied ASPIC+ to build a438
logical analysis of interpretative schemes, and we will use here a simplified version439
of Carneades which will prove to have some tools that can be applied to examples440
illustrating the distinctive argumentation approach to interpretative arguments.441
Both ASPIC+ and Carneades use a scheme called defeasible modus ponens, also442
used in the DefLog argumentation system of Verheij (2008). This scheme is a variant443
of modus ponens in which the antecedent of the conditional premise takes the form444
of a conjunction. Verheij (2008, 24) observed that if you look at the typical argu-445
mentation scheme with eyes slightly narrowed, it appears to have a modus ponens446
format in outline. In the formalism that will be used in the second part of the present447
contribution, a scheme fits the following type of argument structure, where the major448
premise is a defeasible conditional with a conjunctive antecedent.449
Major Premise: A, B, C, . . . ⇒ Z450
Minor Premise: A, B, C, . . .451
Conclusion: Z452
It was shown inWalton (2004, 134–39) how a majority of the schemes recognized in453
the argumentation literature can be tailored to fit this defeasible modus ponens form.454
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In all three systems, arguments are modeled as graphs containing nodes representing455
propositions from the logical language and edges from nodes to nodes. In these456
systems, an argument can be supported or attacked by other arguments, which can457
themselves be supported or attacked by additional arguments. The outcome in a458
typical case of argumentation is a graph structure representing a series of supporting459
arguments, attacks, and counterattacks in a sequence that can be represented using460
an argument map, also often called an argument diagram.461
Carneades models arguments as directed graphs consisting of argument nodes462
connected to statement nodes. The premises and conclusions of an argument graph463
are represented as statement nodes, shown as rectangles in Fig. 3 (Gordon 2010).464
Argument nodes represent different structures of different kinds of arguments, such465
as linked or convergent arguments. A linked argument is one where two or more466
premises function together to support a conclusion. In the argument maps below,467
the name of the argumentation scheme is inserted in the node (the circle) joining the468
premises to the conclusion. As will be shown in the figures, there can be two kinds469
of arguments shown in the node, a pro (supporting argument) or a con (attacking)470
arguments. A supporting argument is represented by a plus sign in its argument471
node, whereas a con argument is represented by a minus sign in the nodes containing472
argumentation schemes such as modus ponens, argument from expert opinion, and473
so forth (http://carneades.github.com). Conflicts between pro and con arguments can474
be resolved using proof standards such as including preponderance of the evidence475
(Gordon and Walton 2009b). Argument graphs are evaluated relative to audiences,476
modeled as a set of assumptions and an assignment of weights to argument nodes.477
An audience is defined as a structure <assumptions, weight>, where assumptions ⊆478
L is a consistent set of literals assumed to be acceptable by the audience and weight479
is a partial function mapping arguments to real numbers in the range 0.0–1.0. These480
numbers represent the relative weights assigned by the audience to the arguments481
(Gordon and Walton 2011).482
In Carneades, there can be compound arguments consisting of several argument483
nodes joined together by edges in the graph so that an argument represents a chain484
of reasoning from the supporting premises down to the ultimate proposition to be485
proved, the so-called statement at issue. Arguments are evaluated on the basis of486
whether the audience accepts the premises or not, and on how strong the various487
arguments making up the graph are. A very simple example of how an argument488
evaluation works in the Carneades system is shown in Fig. 2. The rounded nodes489
represent argumentation schemes accepted by the audience. A pro argument is indi-490
cated by the plus sign in its node. A con argument is represented by a minus sign in491
its argument node. A green (light gray) node means the proposition in it is accepted492
by the audience. A red (dark gray) node means the proposition in it is rejected by the493
audience. If the node is white (no color), the proposition in it is neither accepted nor494
rejected. In the printed version, green appears as light gray and red appears as dark495
gray.496
In both argument diagrams shown in Fig. 2, the ultimate conclusion, statement 1,497
is shown on the far left of the diagram. First, let us consider which premises the audi-498
ence accepts or rejects, as shown in the argument diagram on the left. Argument 2499


































Fig. 2 Carneades graphs displaying an argument evaluation
is a pro argument supporting statement 1, while argument 3 is a con argument500
attacking statement 1. The audience accepts proposition 3 as a premise in argu-501
ment 2, but the other premise, statement 2, is neither accepted nor rejected by the502
audience. Both premises of this additional argument, argument 1, are accepted by503
the audience. Argument a3 is a con argument but one of its premises, statement 5,504
is not accepted. Moreover, this premise is attacked by a con argument, but the only505
premise in this con argument statement 6 is rejected.506
To see how this conflict is resolved, look at the diagram on the right. Since both507
statements 6 and 7 are accepted by the audience, Carneades automatically calculates508
that the conclusion 2 is accepted. However, what about the con argument against509
statement 1 shown at the bottom, namely argument 3? This con argument could510
defeat statement 5, but its premise 8 is rejected by the audience. Therefore, pro511
argument a2 wins out over con argument a3, and so conclusion 1 is shown in green512
as acceptable.513
Carneades also formalizes argumentation schemes. Schemes can be used to con-514
struct or reconstruct arguments, as well as to determine whether a given argument515
properly instantiates the types of argument deemed normatively appropriate accord-516
ing to the scheme requirements.517
The critical questions matching an argumentation scheme cannot be modeled in a518
standard argument graph straightforwardly by representing each critical question as519
an additional implicit premise of the scheme. The reason is that there are two different520
variations on what happens when a respondent asks a critical question (Walton and521
Gordon 2005). These variations concern the pattern of how the burden of proof522
shifts from the proponent to the respondent and back as each critical question is523
asked by the respondent in a dialogue. With some critical questions merely asking524
the question is enough to defeat the proponent’s argument, because the burden of525
proof is shifted onto the proponent’s side, and if the proponent fails to meet this526
burden of proof, the initial argument is immediately defeated. With other critical527
questions, merely asking the critical question is not enough by itself to defeat the528
proponent’s argument. For example, if the respondent asks the bias critical question529
when the proponent has put forward an argument from expert opinion, the proponent530
can simply reply, “What proof do you have that might expert is biased?” On this531
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approach, merely asking the question does not defeat the proponent’s argument until532
the respondent offers some evidence to back it up. Carneades deals with this problem533
of burden of proof for critical questioning by distinguishing three types of premises534
in an argumentation scheme, called ordinary premises, assumptions, and exceptions.535
Assumptions are assumed to be acceptable unless called into question. Exceptions536
are modeled as premises that are not assumed to be acceptable and which can block537
or undercut an argument as it proceeds. Hence, an exception, which is modeled538
in Carneades as an undercutter, only defeats the argument it was attacking if it539
is supported by other arguments which offer reasons to back up the undercutting540
argument. Ordinary premises of an argumentation scheme are treated as assumptions.541
They are assumed to be acceptable in case they are put forward, butmust be supported542
by further arguments to remain acceptable after being challenged by critical questions543
or counterarguments.544
For any one of these critical questions to the effective in defeating the original545
interpretive argument, the respondent must give some indication of what he takes this546
alternative interpretation to be. Thus, it would appear that each of these critical ques-547
tions only defeats the original interpretive argument if some evidence is presented548
by the respondent pinpointing an alternative interpretation which might challenge549
the one originally appealed to by the proponent’s argument.550
Like ASPIC+, Carneades has three ways in which one argument can attack and551
defeat another. An opponent can attack one or more of the premises of an argument.552
This is called an undermining attack. Or an opponent can attack the conclusion by553
presenting an argument to show it is false or unacceptable. This type of attack is554
called a rebutter. But thirdly, the opponent can attack the inferential link joining555
the premises to the conclusion. This type of attack is called an undercutter. For556
example, if the inference is based on a rule, the attack could claim that there is an557
exception to the rule that applies in the present case at issue. This way of modeling558
argumentation is based onPollock’s distinction (Pollock 1995, 40) between twokinds559
of argument attacks called rebutters and undercutters. On Pollock’s view, a rebutter560
is a counterargument that attacks the conclusion of a prior argument, whereas an561
undercutter is a counterargument that attacks the argument link between the premises562
and the conclusion. For example, an argument that fits the argumentation scheme for563
argument from expert opinion can be critically questioned by asking whether the564
expert is biased. In Carneades, such a critical question is modeled as an undercutter,565
and an undercutter is modeled as an argument that defeats the original argument it566
was aimed at only if it is backed up by some additional evidence that supports it.567
Next, we use Carneades to show how the interpretative statutory schemes can be568
applied to an extended sequence of argumentation in a typical case using a large569
argument graph to connect the individual interpretive arguments to each other.570
5 The Education Grants Example571
According to the account of the following case described in Cross (2005, 90),572
Section 1 of the Education Act of 1962 required local education authorities to make573
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grants to students who were “ordinarily resident” in their area, so that the student574
could attend higher education courses. A requirement in the Education Act stipulated575
that to be eligible, the student had to have been ordinarily resident in the UK for three576
years prior to his or her application. The following issue arose: Could someone who577
had come to the UK for education count the period spent in education as ordinary578
residence to qualify for a mandatory grant under the Education Act?579
There were two sides to the issue. The Court of Appeal held that such a person580
could not count this period as ordinary residence, offering the following argument581
(Cross 2005, 90). Lord Denning MR and Everleigh LJ were impressed by the need582
to relate this Act to the policy of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 and its583
successor, the Immigration Act 1971. Under the latter Act, students coming only for584
study had a conditional leave to stay in the country limited to the purpose of study585
which did not involve ordinary residence for the general purposes of everyday life.586
Denning and Everleigh considered that consistency with this Act required the term587
“ordinarily resident” in the Education Act to be interpreted as living as an ordinary588
member of the community would, which would not include residence for the limited589
purpose of study.590
Arriving at a different interpretation, the House of Lords unanimously reversed591
this decision. They felt that the Court of Appeal had given too much weight to592
arguments drawn from the Immigration Act. They offered the following argument,593
quoted from Cross (2005, 91).594
Parliament’s purpose expressed in the Education Act gave no hint of any restriction on595
the eligibility for a mandatory award other than ordinary residence in the United Kingdom596
for three years and a satisfactory educational record. There was nothing expressed in the597
Immigration Act which gave guidance as to the interpretation of the Education Act and,598
indeed, despite a series of immigration measures since 1962, nationality had not formed599
part of the regulations under the Education Act until 1980. Accordingly, the ordinary natural600
meaning of the Education Act prevailed to make the students eligible for a mandatory grant601
if they had resided in the United Kingdom for the purposes of study.602
In this case, it was concluded that the role of the judge should not be to reconcile603
legislative provisions. Instead, it was proposed that the basis for interpretation should604
be that of the ordinary language meaning of the expression “ordinarily resident.”605
The argumentation in this case can be analyzed as an interpretive argument put606
forward by its proponents Denning and Everleigh and countered by an interpretive607
argument put forward in the House of Lords. Below, we use a sequence of three608
argument maps to model the structure of the argumentation sequence in the case.609
The first argument, shown in Fig. 3, cites the Immigration Act of 1971, which610
stated that students coming to a country for study only had a conditional leave to611
stay in the country, adding that this conditional leave does not involve ordinary612
residence for the general purposes of everyday life. Because a related document is613
cited as the basis for drawing a conclusion in support of statutory interpretation, the614
argumentation scheme which is the basis of this argument is the one for argument615
from contextual harmonization (CH), recognized byMacCormick and Summers. For616
present purposes, this scheme is taken to represent the following kind of argument:617
A certain expression that occurs in a document is best interpreted as fitting with its618
usage in a set of related documents; therefore, in this document it will interpreted in619
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Fig. 3 Proponent’s argument in the educational grants example
the same way. In other words, if there is an issue about how to interpret an expression620
in a document, such as a statute, then it can be argued that the best way to interpret621
it is within a context of related documents so that it fits with the way the term has622
been interpreted in these other documents.623
Let us apply the scheme for the argument from contextual harmonization to the624
first part of this example. The notation +CH, referring to a supporting use of argument625
fromcontextual harmonization, has been inserted in the node linking the twopremises626
in the middle of Fig. 2 to the ultimate conclusion shown at the left. Here is a textual627
representation of the arguments, which corresponds to the graph of Fig. 3. Let us628
first examine the top argument by Lord Denning.
Major premise eCH: If the interpretation of E in D as excluding C fits the context, then E in
D should be interpreted as excluding C
Minor premise The interpretation of “residence” in the Education Act as excluding
ResidenceForTheLimitedPurposeOfStudy fits the context
Conclusion “residence” in Education Act should be interpreted as excluding
ResidenceForTheLimitedPurposeOfStudy
629
The supporting argument may appeal to the fact that in other pieces of legislation630
“ordinary residence” excludes indeed “residence for the limited purpose of study.”631
The ultimate conclusion is the statement that non-UK students cannot count the632
period as ordinary residence.633
Next, we turn to an analysis of the argumentation in the second quoted text above,634
where the opponent, in this instance the House of Lords, put forward a counterargu-635
ment.636
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Major premise eCH: If an expression E in document D1 also occurs in a related document
D2, and the meaning of E in D1 excludes a concept C, then the interpretation
of the expression E in D2 as excluding C fits the context
Minor premise The meaning of “residence” in the related document Immigration Act
excludes concept “residence for the limited purpose of study”
Conclusion The interpretation of an expression “residence” in the Education Act as
excluding ResidenceForTheLimitedPurposeOfStudy fits the context
Parliament’s purpose expressed in the Education Act gave no hint of any restriction on the637
eligibility for a mandatory award other than ordinary residence in the United Kingdom for638
three years and a satisfactory educational record.639
This argument fits the scheme for inclusionary argument from intention (+iAI):
Major premise +iAI: If the interpretation of E in D as excluding S conflicts with legislative
purpose, then E in D should be interpreted as including S
Minor premise The interpretation of an expression “residence” in the Education Act as
excluding ResidenceForTheLimitedPurposeOfStudy conflicts with legislative
purpose
Conclusion “residence” in Education Act should be interpreted as including
ResidenceForTheLimitedPurposeOfStudy
640
The reason why the minor premise holds is provided by the following supporting641
counterfactual argument.
Major premise If the linguistic meaning of E in D includes S, and there are no hints that the
legislator intended to exclude S from the meaning of E in D, then the
interpretation of E in D as excluding S conflicts with legislative intention
Minor premise 1 The linguistic meaning of “residence” in the Education Act includes
ResidenceForTheLimitedPurposeOfStudy
Minor premise 2 There are no hints the legislator intended to exclude
ResidenceForTheLimitedPurposeOfStudy from the meaning of “residence” in
Education Act
Conclusion The interpretation of an expression “residence” in the Education Act as
excluding ResidenceForTheLimitedPurposeOfStudy conflicts with legislative
intention
642
This argument is shown in Fig. 4 as a counterargument to the one in Fig. 3.643
We leave it as an open problem how the argument on the right could be more644
fully represented, for example, by including the “there are no hints” statement as645
a premise in an a contrario argument. This would make the argument on the right646
more complex. Hint: it is possible to solve this problem by invoking the notion of an647
enthymeme.648
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Fig. 4 Respondent’s rebuttal to the educational grants example
Next let us look at the other argument just below this one. Cross (2005, 91–92)649
offers this account of this part of the case.650
Lord Denning MR and Everleigh LJ were impressed by the need to relate this Act to the651
policy of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 and its successor, the Immigration Act652
1971. Under the latter act, students coming only for study had a conditional leave to stay in653
the country limited to the purpose of study and this did not involve ordinary residence for the654
general purposes of everyday life. They considered that consistency with this Act requires655
the term ‘ordinarily resident’ in the Education Act to be interpreted as living as an ordinary656
member of the community would, which could not include residence for the limited purpose657
of study.658
We are told in the quoted part of the text that Denning and Everleigh considered that659
consistency with the Education Act requires living as an ordinary member of the660
community and that being an ordinary member of the community does not include661
residence for the limited purpose of study. Accordingly, we have represented these662
two propositions as premises in a linked argument supporting the conclusion that663
conditional leave does not involve ordinary residence, as shown in Fig. 5 at the664
bottom right. The rightmost argument supports one premise of the argument to the665
left of it. It is labeled as a supporting argument labeled +iPr in Fig. 5. The conclusion666
of this argument is the opposite of the conclusion shown in Fig. 4.667
What we see in Fig. 5 is therefore a rebuttal because it presents an argument that668
attacks the ultimate conclusion of the original argument shown in Fig. 4. There is669
a conflict between the argument shown in Fig. 5 and the previous two arguments670
shown in Figs. 3 and 4.671
We have chosen to use the term “interpretation” instead of “meaning,” because the672
latter term is not only vague but is itself susceptible tomany contested interpretations.673
Nevertheless, it can be said generally that what the interpreters of the statue are674
generally seeking is an interpretation that they contend that represents the genuine,675
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Fig. 5 Respondent’s premise attack in the educational grants example
true, or real meaning of the textual item they are discussing. This notion that there is676
what is called a real meaning underneath the vagaries in the text being examined or677
deconstructed has however been subject to some abuse in philosophy. For all these678
reasons, we generally prefer using the term “interpretation” to the term “meaning.”679
The evaluation system of Carneades compares the set of pro arguments against680
the set of con arguments if the two sets of arguments are independent of each other.681
However, summing the weights of arguments to check if the sum of the weights of682
the pro arguments outweighs the sum of the weights of the con arguments is only683
feasible if it be assumed that the two arguments are independent of each other. This684
can be done with Carneades, but it requires an additional evaluation.685
As with all arguments found in natural language texts, it is possible to analyze686
the given text in further depth by bringing out more implicit assumptions and more687
subtle inferences. However, building an argument map of a real argument expressed688
in natural language is very often a difficult interpretive task requiring learned skills689
and often itself providing many challenges of textual interpretation. Generally, one690
finds there are alternative interpretations opened up as the text of the cases is analyzed691
in greater depth and more implicit premises and arguments are brought out. Building692
an argument diagram can often raise important questions of argument interpretation693
and analysis that might not be initially visible to someone who is trying to deal694
with the argument or find out what to do with it. To illustrate some of the problems695
inherent in such as task, we go back to the Dunnachie example.696


























Statutory Interpretation as Argumentation 541
6 Fitting Interpretive Schemes to Cases697
Dunnachie, following the commentary of MacCormick (2005, 128), offers an exam-698
ple of argument from contextual harmonization. The scheme for argument from699
contextual harmonization requires that a particular sentence in a statute should be700
interpreted considering the whole statute and any set of related statutes that are avail-701
able. In line with the model of interpretive schemes introduced in Sect. 2, the scheme702
for contextual harmonization as applied to Dunnachie takes the following form.
Major premise +CH: If the interpretation of E in D as M fits the context, then E in D should
be interpreted as M
Minor premise The interpretation of “loss” in the Employment Relations Act as
PecuniaryLoss fits the context
Conclusion “loss” in Education Act should be interpreted as PecuniaryLoss
703
The reason why this interpretation fits context is provided by the following sup-704
porting argument, which addresses the case in which the same expression occurs in705
different positions in the document (for simplicity’s sake, we do not include in the706
scheme the possibility that there are multiple occurrences of the expression in the707
same document):
Major premise If E besides occurring in position P1 of document D also occurs in positions
P1, …, Pn, where it has meaning M, then E in P1 should also be interpreted
as M
Minor premise “loss” besides occurring in Section 2 of the Employment Relations Act also
occurs in Section 4 where it has the meaning “pecuniary loss”
Conclusion “loss” in Section 2 of the Employment Relations Act should be interpreted as
“pecuniary loss”
708
Again following the commentary of MacCormick (2005, 128) on Dunnachie,709
the following example can be given to show how Carneades models a pro argument710
supporting a claim in a case where there is also a con argument attacking the same711
claim (Fig. 6).712
The claim that “loss” should be interpreted as including both financial loss and713
emotional loss was partly based on a statement made in an earlier case. In this case,714
Johnson Unisys Ltd., Lord Hoffman had made the statement that an extension of the715
word “loss” to “emotional loss” could be made. So, it would appear, at least initially,716
that the argument drawn from the statement can be classified as an instance of a pro717
argument from precedent.718
The reader will recall from the list in Sect. 2 that according to the description719
given byMacCormick and Summers, (1987) an interpretive argument fromprecedent720
requires that if a term has a previous judicial interpretation, it should be interpreted721
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to fit that previous interpretation. In the previous case of Norton Tool Co. v Tewson,722
it had been ruled that “loss” was to be interpreted as signifying exclusively financial723
loss. Following the lines of the analysis of the structure of interpretative schemes724
in section, the scheme for interpretive argument from precedent can be cast in the725
following inclusionary and exclusionary forms.
Major premise ePr: If the interpretation of E in D as excluding S fits precedents, then E in D
should be interpreted as excluding S
Minor premise The interpretation of an “loss” in the Employment Relations Act as excluding
EmotionalDamage fits precedents
Conclusion “loss” in Education Act should be interpreted as excluding EmotionalDamage
726
The supporting argument is the following:
Major premise If E in D was understood in precedent P as excluding C, then the
interpretation of E in D as excluding C fits precedents
Minor premise “loss” in the Employment Relations Act was understood in Norton as
excluding EmotionalDamage
Conclusion The interpretation of “loss” in the Employment Relations Act as excluding
EmotionalDamage fits precedents
727
Here is a positive application of the argument by precedent:728
A supporting argument is the following:729
The arguments could be further developed by pointing to the clues which support730
this understanding of the precedent, using the argument diagram in Fig. 7.731
Fig. 6 Use of the scheme for argument from contextual harmonization in Dunnachie
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Major premise iPr: If the interpretation of E in D as including C fits precedents, then E in D
should be interpreted as M
Minor premise The interpretation of “loss” in the Employment Relations Act as including
EmotionalDamage fits precedents
Conclusion “loss” in Education Act should be interpreted as including EmotionalDamage
Major premise If E in D was understood in precedent P as including C, then the
interpretation of E in D as including C fits precedents
Minor premise The interpretation of an expression “loss” in the Employment Relations Act
was understood in precedent Johnson vs Unisys as including
EmotionalDamage
Conclusion The interpretation of an expression “loss” in the Employment Relations Act as
including EmotionalDamage fits precedents
But in Dunnachie, in addition to this pro instance of interpretive argument from732
precedent, there was also a con argument for the same conclusion. There is a conflict733
between the two interpretations shown in Fig. 8.734
How could this conflict be resolved? The answer requires taking a closer look at735
the interpretive scheme for argument from precedent to see how one precedent can736
be stronger than another in supporting or attacking a claim about how a statute or737
law should be interpreted.738
This way of modeling the scheme rests on the assumption that the user already has739
a clear idea of what a precedent is. Schauer (1987) has shown that arguments from740
precedent are already highly familiar in everyday conversational argumentation. This741
suggests that we need to begin with some intuitive understanding of what constitutes742
Fig. 7 Use of a prior case as a precedent supporting a textual interpretation
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Fig. 8 Conflicting pro and con interpretive arguments from precedent
a precedent case. We could also build on the scheme for argument from precedent743
generally known in the argumentation literature, but there are differences of opinion744
on how that should be formulated (Walton 2010), in particular on the issue of how745
that scheme is related to the one for argument from analogy.746
In his commentary on the case, MacCormick (2005, 129) made the following747
argument to support seeing this statement by another court as a binding premise in748
an argument from precedent. First, this ruling had been followed and approved many749
times. Second, it contained an acceptable rationale for interpreting loss exclusively750
as financial loss. Therefore, MacCormick concluded that it was a better guide for751
future rulings than the Johnson case.752
In contrast, MacCormick put forward arguments advancing several reasons why753
LordHoffman’s statement in Johnsonmight not constitute a binding precedent. First,754
they were not necessary to the decision reached in Johnson. Second, it had not been755
followed by other courts as a binding precedent. Third, although it was open to the756
House of Lords to have overruled Norton Tool, establishing a new ruling on the757
meaning of loss, this was not done. These arguments were used by MacCormick to758
question whether the remarks made by Lord Hoffman constitute a precedent binding759
on subsequent cases. These further arguments are shown in Fig. 9. For simplicity760
and readability’s sake, we do not rigidly follow the structures illustrated above, and761
we omit to fully indicate the canons that are applied.762


































Fig. 9 Conflict resolved by taking other arguments into account
Let us say that all the propositions shown in the five rightmost rectangles are763
accepted by the audience. These five rectangles are shown in green backgrounds.764
Next, look at the pro argument from precedent at the top. Each of the two arguments765
supporting the proposition that Norton Tool Co. v Tewson is a precedent case has766
only one premise, and in both instances, that premise is accepted. Therefore, the767
proposition that Norton tool Co. v Tewson is a precedent case is automatically shown768
as accepted by Carneades. Let us also assume that the other premise of this argument769
is accepted. Since both premises of the argument are now accepted, the ultimate770
conclusion shown at the left of Fig. 9 is now automatically shown as accepted.771
But now let us look at the bottom argument, the con argument from precedent.772
Since all three of its premises are accepted, the con argument attacking the proposition773
that Johnson v Unisys is a precedent case is successful in defeating it. Hence, this774
proposition is shown in a rectangle with a white background, indicating that it is775
not accepted. Actually, the additional evidence provided by the two pro arguments776
shown at the top right of Fig. 9 is not needed for the pro argument from precedent777
to defeat the con argument from precedent in the case. It is enough that because one778
premise of the con argument (shown in white at the bottom of Fig. 9) is defeated, the779
pro argument from precedent at the top prevails.780
Summing everything up, the pro argument from precedent at the top prevails over781
the con argument from precedent at the bottom, because one of the premises of the782
con argument is unacceptable. It is shown by Carneades as not accepted because it783


































Fig. 10 Attacking an interpretive argument from precedent
is defeated by the applicable con argument - A. Only the pro argument is accepted,784
and so the conclusion is accepted. Hence, the conflict is resolved.785
There is another way of modeling the conflict between the two arguments from786
precedent.787
Using the scheme for argument from precedent put forward in Sect. 2, Mac-788
Cormick’s argument could be modeled as an undercutter critically questioning789
whether the top argument shown in Fig. 10 fits the argumentation scheme for argu-790
ment from precedent. This way of interpreting MacCormick’s remarks on how to791
model the argumentation in this instance is to take his argument above as an under-792
cutter that attacks the argument used in the Johnson case by arguing that it is ques-793
tionable whether the pro argument shown in Fig. 10 is a proper instantiation of794
the scheme for argument from precedent. Such an interpretation of MacCormick’s795
evaluation of the argumentation is shown in Fig. 10.796
This case is an interesting one because the way MacCormick analyzes the argu-797
mentation in it, because there is still another alternative interpretation of it that is798
possible, judging from his remarks. It might be possible to argue that even though799
the ruling in Johnson on how to interpret loss was not a binding precedent, because800
it was not necessary to the decision made in that case, still it could be taken to be a801
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weaker kind of precedent. MacCormick (2005, 129) distinguishes between a binding802
precedent and a precedent that is persuasive but not binding. Honoring this distinc-803
tion, interpretation of the word “loss” in Johnson could be taken as a weaker kind of804
precedent. Following this line of argument, the conflict between the two arguments805
from precedent no longer represents a deadlock because the stronger precedent from806
Norton would have priority over the weaker precedent from Johnson. Carneades807
and ASPIC+, as well as other systems, recognize different kinds of priority order-808
ings on rules, and so that would be another way that AI systems could model the809
argumentation in this case.810
In Sect. 2, we only proposed schemes for some of the interpretive arguments to811
give the reader an idea of what these schemes should ultimately look like. However,812
especially with some of the schemes, the descriptions of the different kinds of inter-813
pretive arguments given byMacCormick and Summers are not enough in themselves814
to definitively formulate thematching scheme. In particular, the scheme for argument815
from precedent needs more study by applying it to cases before a definitive version816
can be given.817
7 Formalizing Interpretive Arguments—General Structure818
In this section, we shall provide a general formal structure for interpretive arguments,819
based on the approach of interpretive arguments introduced and exemplified in the820
previous sections. Let us first summarize that approach.821
Interpretive arguments can be distinguished along two different criteria: positive822
versus negative and total versus partial. The first distinction concerns whether they823
argue that a certain interpretation should be adopted or rather rejected. The second824
distinction pertains as to whether they address the whole interpretation of a term, or825
only the inclusion or exclusion of a subclass in the term’s meaning. Correspondingly,826
partial interpretive arguments can be distinguished into exclusionary and inclusionary827
ones.828
All interpretive arguments we shall consider are based on canons, namely defea-829
sible conditionals, stating that if certain conditions are or are not met, a certain830
interpretive condition should or should not be adopted. Canons may be positive or831
negative dispending on whether their consequent is the obligation to adopt or not to832
adopt a certain interpretation. Positive canons can also have a negative counterpart,833
to the extent that the absence of the condition they require leads to the rejection of834
an interpretation.835
In this section, we shall propose appropriate formal structures for capturing all836
these forms of interpretive arguments.837
Let us start with positive and negative total interpretive arguments. Both structures838
have the following elements: an expression E (word, phrase, sentence, etc.) occurs839
in a document D (statute, regulation, contract, etc.), interpreting this occurrence840
as meaning M satisfies the condition of a certain interpretive scheme (of ordinary841
language, technical language, purpose, etc.). Positive canons state that if all these842
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elements are satisfied we are licensed to derive the interpretive conclusion that E in843
D should be interpreted as M. Negative canons state that if an interpretation I would844
not fit the scheme, then E in D should not be interpreted as M. In Sartor et al. (2014),845
we modeled interpretive claims as deontic claims, stating the obligation to adopt a846
certain interpretation. Here, we follow a different approach, focusing on the relation-847
ship between an interpretation and its justification, as a metalinguistic discourse on848
why a meaning is the best interpretation of an expression. In this sense, we model849
interpretive claims as terminological assertions concerning best interpretations of the850
contested or potentially contested expressions within a legal text (for a similar idea,851
see Araszkiewicz 2013).852
All canons are modeled as defeasible rules (expressed in the form r :853
ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ⇒ ψ , where r is the rule name, where ϕ1, . . . , ϕ1 and ψ are formulas in854
a logical language, ϕ1, . . . , ϕ1 being the antecedents, and ψ being the consequent of855
the rule.856
We express interpretive conclusions as claims concerning conceptual relations857
between a meaning M that is proposed and the outcome of the best legal interpre-858
tation of the linguistic occurrence at issue, namely expression E in document D859
(Bezuidenhout 1997; Carston 2002, 2013; Soames 2008; Sperber and Wilson 1986;860
Wilson and Sperber 2004). Such an outcome is denoted by the function expression861
BestInt(E, D), denoting the best interpretation of expression E in document D. Con-862
ceptual relations are expressed with description logic symbols: ≡ for conceptual863
equivalence, ≡ for difference,  for inclusion. Thus BestInt (E,D) = M means that864
the best interpretation of expression E in document D is represented by meaning M.865
Thus, a general pattern for positive total interpretive canons can be expressed as866
follows:867
C: expression E occurs in document D,868
the interpretation of E in D as M satisfies the condition of positive canon C ⇒869
BestInt(E, D) ≡ M870
Here is an example:871
OL: expression E occurs in document D,872
the interpretation of E in D as M fits ordinary language ⇒873
BestInt(E, D) ≡ M874
Similarly, negative canons claim that the best interpretation is not the proposed one,875
as in the following example, based on the non-redundancy canon:876
NR: expression E occurs in document D,877
the interpretation of E in D as M is redundant ⇒878
BestInt(E, D) ≡ M879
Let us now provide examples for partial interpretations, such as, for exclusionary880
interpretative claims:881
eSAC: expression E occurs in document D,882
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the interpretation of expression E in the D as including S conflicts with usual meaning ⇒883
BestInt(E, D)C  S884
where BestInt(E, D)C is the complement of BestInt(E, D), and for inclusionary interpretive885
claims:886
iSAC: expression E occurs in document D,887
the interpretation of E in the D as excluding S conflicts with the usual meaning ⇒888
BestInt(E, D)  S889
We can also identify a pattern for priority arguments between different (instances of)890
interpretive canons (we use  to express priority).891
C: concerning expression E in document D, the interpretation as M1 according to canon C1892
meets the priority criterion with regard to the interpretation as M2 according to canon C2 ⇒893
C1(E, D, M )  C2(E, D, M2).894
where C(E,D,M) denotes the instance of canon C which attributes meaning M to895
expression E in document D. Consider, for instance, Alexy and Dreier’s idea that in896
criminal law ordinary language has priority over technical language.897
P1: expression E in document D concerns Criminal law ⇒898
OL(E, D, M1)  TL(E, D, M2).899
where OL(E,D,M1) denotes the instance of canon OL (ordinary languge) which900
attributes meaning M1 to expression E in document D, and similarly for TL (techical901
languge). In this sense, interpretive arguments can be ordered in hierarchies depend-902
ing on the specific legal context.903
For reasoning about interpretation, we need an argumentation system including904
strict rules, defeasible rules, and preference between rules, such as the system devel-905
oped by Prakken and Sartor (1996), the ASPIC+ system (Prakken 2010), or the906
Carneades system (Gordon and Walton 2009a). We express defeasible rules in the907
form r : ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ⇒ ψ and strict rules in the form ϕ1, . . . , ϕn → ψ . We use908
arrows → and ↔ for material conditional and biconditional of propositional logic.909
We also assume that our system includes the inferences of classical logic, namely910
that for any propositions of classical logic ϕ and ψ , if ϕ is derivable from ψ , then911
we have a strict rule ϕ → ψ .912
Here, we assume that argument A including defeasible rules may be defeated913
in two ways. This first consists in successfully rebutting A, i.e., by contradicting914
the conclusion of a subargument of A, through an argument that is not weaker than915
the attacked subarguments (we assume that A too is a subargument of itself). More916
precisely, B rebuts A when (a) B’s conclusion is incompatible with the conclusion917
of a subargument A′ of A, and (b) B is not weaker than A′, i.e., A′≯B (see Prakken918
2010). Condition (b) corresponds to the idea that if A were stronger than B, it would919
resist B’s challenge.920
Regarding comparative strength, we assume that the comparison between two921
arguments A and B is to be assessed according to two criteria:922
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(a) preference for strict arguments (those only contains strict rules) over defeasible923
ones (those also containing defeasible rules): If A is strict and B is defeasible,924
then A > B.925
(b) preference between defeasible arguments according to the last link principle: If926
A is preferable to B according to the last link principle, then A > B.927
The last link principle assumes a partial strict ordering over defeasible rules and928
compares arguments A and B having incompatible conclusions by considering the929
sets of the last defeasible rules which support such conclusions in the two arguments930
(see for a formal characterization, Prakken and Sartor 1996; Prakken 2010).931
The second way of defeating an argument A consists in undercutting A, i.e., in932
producing an argument B that rejects the application of a defeasible rule included933
in argument A. Let us express the claim that a rule does not apply, by denying the934
corresponding name of the rule: The statement ¬r denies that rule named r applies.935
Then, we can say in general terms that argument B undercuts argument A, if B has the936
conclusion¬r,where r is the top rule of a subargumentA′ ofA. For instance, argument937
[→ a; r1: a ⇒ b] is undercut by argument [→ c; r2: c ⇒ ¬r1]. When we want to938
refer to the rule instance that is obtained by specifying a general rule r relatively939
to entities e, we use the expression r(e). Thus, the expression ¬r(e) expresses the940
claim that the rule instance r(e) does not hold, or, in other words, the claim that the941
rule r does not apply to entities e. For instance, the proposition ¬OL(123(1)ERA)942
expresses the claim that canon OL does not apply to the text 123(1)ERA.943
Semantics for an argumentation system can be based on the idea of an extension,944
namely a set of compatible arguments, which includes resources (arguments) that945
respond to all defeaters of arguments in the set. Here, we adopt the approach that946
consists in looking for most inclusive extensions, which are called preferred exten-947
sions (Dung 1995). An argument is then considered to be justified if it is included948
in all such extensions. It is considered defensible if it is included in some (but not949
necessarily in all) extensions.1 The arguments that are defensible but not justified are950
only in some preferred extensions: Their status remains undecided, as their inclusion951
in a preferred extension depends on what other arguments are already included in952
the extension, different choices being possible.953
Consider for instance the following set of arguments:954
{[a], [b], [a, r1: a ⇒ c], [b, r2: b ⇒ ¬c]}. We have two preferred extensions955
E1  {[a], [b], [a, r1: a ⇒ c]} and E2  {[a]{[a], [b], [b, r2: b ⇒ ¬c]}}. Each956
extension includes an argument that is defeated, but also defeats an argument in the957
other extension: A1  [a, a ⇒ c] for E1 and A2  [b, b ⇒ ¬c] for E2. So, each one958
of the two extensions is able to respond to all defeaters of any argument it includes.959
A1 and A2 are merely defensible as they are incompatible, and we do not have, in960
the given set of arguments, reasons for preferring one to the other.961
Assume that we add argument [r3 :⇒ r1  r2]. Then, we have just one preferred962
extension, namely {[a], [b], [a, r1: a ⇒ c], [r3 :⇒ r1  r2]}, since, according to the963
preference r3 :⇒ r1  r2, A1 is no longer defeated by A2.964
1In Sartor chapter 3, part II, this volume, on “Defeasibility in Law,” a semantics based on labeling,
which is equivalent to the extension based semantic here presented, was adopted.
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Moving from arguments to conclusions, we have two possibilities for defining965
what conclusions are justified.Oneoption is to viewaconclusion as justifiedwhen it is966
established by a justified argument. The other option consists in viewing a conclusion967
as justified when it is supported in all preferred extensions possibly through different968
arguments. More precisely, we get the following definition:969
Definition (Defensibility and Justifiability).970
• Defensibility. Claim ϕ is defensible with regard to argument set A if there exists971
a preferred extension S of A that contains an argument with conclusion ϕ.972
• Strong justifiability. Claim ϕ is strongly justifiable with regard to argument set A,973
if ϕ is the conclusion of an argumentA that is contained in all preferred extensions.974
• Weak justifiability. Claim ϕ is weakly justifiable with regard to argument set A if975
all preferred extensions of contain arguments having conclusion ϕ.976
Note that the weak definition of justifiability is broader than the strong, since977
it allows for a justifiable conclusion to be obtained through different incompatible978
arguments, included in different extensions. This is the notion that seems to be more979
appropriate to interpretation, as we shall argue in the following.980
8 Interpretive Arguments—A Formalization981
An interpretive argument can be constructed by combining an interpretive canonwith982
the corresponding interpretive conditions. For instance, an argument from ordinary983
language would have the following form (in each argument, for conciseness sake,984
we put the general norm rather than its instantiation to the case at hand):985
Argument A19867
1. expression “Loss” occurs in document 123(1)ERA988
2. the interpretation of “Loss” in 123(1)ERA as PecuniaryLoss fits ordinary language989
3. OL: expression E occurs in document D∧990
the interpretation of E in D as M fits ordinary language ⇒991
BestInt(E, D) ≡ M992
——————————————————————————————993
C.BestInt(“Loss”, 123(1)ERA) ≡ PecuniaryLoss994
Interpretive arguments can be attacked by counterarguments. For instance, the fol-995
lowing counterargument based on technical language successfully rebuts the above996
argument based on ordinary language, by providing a different incompatible inter-997
pretation (assuming that no priority can be established and that concepts are different998
when denoted with a different name):999
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Argument A210001
1. expression “Loss” occurs in document 123(1)ERA1002
2. the interpretation of “Loss” in 123(1)ERA as PecuniaryOrEmotioalLoss fits technical1003
language1004
3. TL: expression E occurs in document D∧1005
the interpretation of E in D as M fits technical language ⇒1006
BestInt(E, D) ≡ PecuniaryOrEmotionalLoss1007
——————————————————————————————1008
BestInt(“Loss”, 123(1)ERA) ≡ PecuniaryOrEmotionalLoss1009
The interpretation based on ordinary language could also attacked by directly denying1010
its conclusion, for instance by a non-redundancy argument claiming that “Loss”1011
should not be interpreted in this way, since this would make 123(1)ERA redundant.1012
Argument A310134
1. expression “Loss” occurs in document 123(1)ERA1015
2. the interpretation of “Loss” in 123(1)ERA as PecuniaryLoss makes the norm redundant1016
3. NR: expression E occurs in document D∧1017
the interpretation of E in D as M makes the norm redundant ⇒1018
BestInt(E, D) ≡ M1019
——————————————————————————————1020
BestInt(“Loss”, 123(1)ERA ≡ PecuiaryLoss1021
A rebutting attack can also be played by using partial (inclusionary or exclusionary1022
interpretive) arguments.1023
Argument A410245
1. expression “Loss” occurs in document 123(1)ERA1026
2. the interpretation of “Loss” in 123(1)ERAasEmotionalLoss conflictswith usualmeaning1027
3. eAC: expression E occurs in document D,1028
the interpretation of expression E in the D as including S conflicts with usual meaning1029
⇒ BestInt(E, D)C  S1030
——————————————————————————————1031
BestInt(“Loss”, 123(1)ERA EmotionalLoss1032
where BestInt(“Loss”, 123(1)ERA)C denotes the complement of1033
BestInt(“Loss”, 123(1)ERA).1034
Given that PecuniaryOrEmotionalLoss includes emotional loss, i.e.,1035
4. PecuniaryOrEmotionalLoss  EmotionalLoss1036
we can conclude1037
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5. BestInt(“Loss”, 123(1)ERA) ≡ PecuniaryOrEmotionalLoss1038
which contradicts the conclusion of the above argument A2.1039
An undercutting attack against the ordinary language argument could bemounted1040
by arguing that the expression “loss” in the Employment Rights Act is used in a1041
technical context, e.g., in the context of the discipline of industrial relations, where1042
arguments from ordinary language do not apply. Thus, this canon is inapplicable to1043
the expression Loss in 123(1)ERA, which is expressed using the formalism above as1044
¬OL(123(1)ERA).1045
1. expression “Loss” occurs in document 123(1)ERA1046
2. 123(1)ERA is a technical context1047
3. TC: expression E occurs in document D,1048
D is a technical context ⇒ ¬OL(E)1049
——————————————————————————————1050
¬OL(123(1)ERA )1051
9 Preference Arguments over Interpretive Arguments1052
We may have preferences over interpretive arguments. For example, in Italy, the1053
Court of Cassation revised its interpretation of the term Loss (danno) as occurring1054
in the Italian Civil Code (ICC) using an argument from substantive reasons (the1055
constitutional value of health): The Court thus rejected the traditional interpretation1056
as pecuniary damage, arguing that also damage to health should also be included in1057
the scope of the term (and consequently compensated):1058
Argument A1105960
1. expression “Loss” occurs in document Art2043ICC1061
2. the interpretation of “Loss” in Art2043ICC as PecuniaryLoss fits legal history1062
3. OL: expression E occurs in document D,1063
the interpretation of E in D as M fits legal history ⇒ BestInt(E, D) ≡ M1064
——————————————————————————————1065
BestInt(“Loss”, Art2043ICC ≡ PecuniaryLoss)1066
Argument A210678
1. expression “Loss” occurs in document Art2043ICC1069
2. the interpretation of “Loss” in Art2043ICC as PecuniaryLossOrDamageToHealth con-1070
tributes to substantive reasons1071
3. SR: expression E occurs in document D,1072
the interpretation of E in D as M contributes to substantive reasons ⇒1073
BestInt(E, D) ≡ M1074
——————————————————————————————1075
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BestInt(“Loss”, Art2043ICC) ≡ PecuniaryLossOrDamageToHealth1076
These two arguments conflict (rebut each other), as:1077
PecuniaryLoss ≡ PecuniaryLossOrDamageToHealth10789
To address the conflict, the judges argued that the second argument defeats the first,1080
since SR in this context contributes to constitutional values.1081
Argument 310823
1. The interpretation of expression “Loss” in Art2043ICC, as1084
PecuniaryLossOrDamageToHealth according to SR contributes to constitutional1085
values1086
2. SR: The interpretation of expression E in D, as M according to SR contributes to consti-1087
tutional values⇒ SR(E, D, M )  LH (E, D, M ′)1088
——————————————————————————————1089
SR(“Loss”, Art2043ICC, PecuniaryLossOrDamageToHealth) 
LH (“Loss”, Art2043ICC, PecuniaryLossOrDamageToHealth)
1090
10 From Best Interpretations to Individual Claims1091
We must be able to move from interpretive claims to conclusion in individual cases,1092
namely from conceptual assertions to individual claims. For this purpose, we can1093
adopt general patterns for strict rules, which provide for the transition from interpre-1094
tive claims to assertions concerning individuals:1095
1. BestInt(E, D) ≡ M → ∀x [ED (x) ↔ M (x)]1096
2. BestInt(E, D)  M → ∀x [M (x) → ED (x)]1097
3. BestInt(E, D)C  M → ∀x [M (x) → ¬ED (x)]1098
wherex is sequence of variableswhich is required by conceptM,M (x) is the predicate1099
corresponding to concept M, and ED is a predicate representing the occurrence of E1100
in D at issue. Consider for instance the above interpretive claim according to which1101
BestInt(“loss”, 125ERA) ≡ PecuniaryLoss11023
The corresponding instance of transition rule 1 would be:1104
BestInt(“loss”, 125ERA) ≡ PecuniaryLoss1105
→ ∀x [LossERA(x, y, z) ↔ PecuniaryLoss(x, y, z)
]
11067
To be read as: If the best interpretation of expression “loss” in document Section 1251108
of the Employment Relations Act is concept PecuniaryLoss, then a person x in an1109
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event y has a “loss” of amount z (as understood in Section 125 of the Employment1110
Relations Act) if and only if x in y has a pecuniary loss of z.1111
Let us assume that John in his unfair dismissal byTomhad a pecuniary loss of Euro1112
100, i.e., PecuniaryLoss(John, DismissalByTom, 100). Let us expand the ordinary1113
language argument with the following: the latter assumption, the above instance of1114
transition rule 1, and strict rules corresponding to an inference of classical logic. We1115
get the following argument (where we list with the premises in the argument and1116
with letters the intermediate conclusions).1117
Argument A411189
1. expression “Loss” occurs in document 123(1)ERA1120
2. the interpretation of “Loss” in 123(1)ERA as PecuniaryLoss fits ordinary language1121
3. OL: expression E occurs in document D∧1122
the interpretation of E in D as M fits ordinary language ⇒1123
BestInt(E, D) ≡ M1124
——————————————————————————————1125
a. BestInt(“Loss”, 123(1)ERA ≡ PecuniaryLoss (from 1, 2, and 3)1126




b. ∀x [LossERA(x, y, z) ↔ PecuniaryLoss(x, y, z)
]
(from a and 4)1129
5. PecuniaryLoss(John, DismissalByTom, 100)1130
——————————————————————————————1131
c. LossERA(John, DismissalByTom, 100) (by classical logic) (from b and 5)1132
The mixture of interpretive and other arguments that are needed for a legal conclu-1133
sion can also include additional conceptual relations. For instance, let us assume that1134
we know that John has sustained a pecuniary loss of 100 Euros, as a consequence of1135
his unfair dismissal. Since the concept of pecuniary loss is included in the concept1136
of pecuniary or emotional loss, we can infer that he suffered a pecuniary or emo-1137
tional loss. This conclusion would enable us to conclude that John has a loss in the1138
sense of Section 125 (LossERA(John, DismissalByTom, 100)), also on the basis of1139
the interpretation of loss as PecuniaryOrEmotionalLoss, according to an argument1140
Argument A5 which includes this interpretation.1141
Argument A511423
1. expression “Loss” occurs in document 123(1)ERA1144
2. the interpretation of “Loss” in 123(1)ERA as PecuniaryOrEmotionalLoss fits technical1145
language1146
3. TL: expression E occurs in document D∧1147
the interpretation of E in D as M fits technical language ⇒1148
BestInt(E, D) ≡ M1149
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——————————————————————————————1150
a. BestInt(“Loss”, 123(1)ERA ≡ PecuniaryOrEmotionalLoss (from 1, 2, and 3)1151
4. BestInt(“loss”, 125ERA) ≡ PecuniaryOrEmotionalLoss →
∀x[LossERA(x, y, z) ↔.PecuniaryOrEmotionalLoss(x, y, z)
1152
——————————————————————————————1153
b. ∀x [LossERA(x, y, z) ↔ PecuniaryOrEmotionalLoss(x, y, z)
]
(from a, and 4)1154
5. ∀x [PecuniaryLoss(x, y, z) → PecuniaryOrEmotionalLoss(x, y, z)]1155
6. PecuniaryLoss(John, DismissalByTom, 100)1156
——————————————————————————————1157
c. PecuniaryOrEmotionalLoss(John, DismissalByTom, 100) (from 5, and 6)1158
——————————————————————————————1159
d. LossERA(John, DismissalByTom, 100) (from 5 and c)1160
Arguments A4 and A5 are inconsistent, as they include incompatible interpretive con-1161
clusions (incompatible subarguments): According to conclusion (a) in A4, the best1162
interpretion of “loss” in Section 125 isPecuniaryLoss, while according to conclusion1163
(a) in A5 the best interpretation is a different concept, namely PecuniaryOrEmotion-1164
alLoss.However, the two arguments lead to the same conclusion in the case of John’s1165
dismissal: He suffers a loss of 100, as understood in Section 125 of the Employment1166
Relations act.1167
Therefore, we may view this conclusion as legally justified, namely as weakly1168
justified. This is the case even though we are unable to make a choice between1169
the two incompatible interpretations (the two competing interpretive arguments are1170
both defeasible, and neither is justified), as the conclusion follows from both such1171
interpretations. This view corresponds to the idea that only relevant issues have to be1172
addressed in legal decision-making: The issue of whether “loss” is limited or not to1173
pecuniary losses is irrelevant in John’s case, since he has only suffered a pecuniary1174
loss (this issue would be relevant if he had on the contrary suffered instead, or1175
additionally, an emotional loss).1176
11 Conclusions1177
In this chapter, our goal was to show how interpretive schemes can be formulated1178
in such a manner that they can be incorporated into a formal and computational1179
argumentation system such as Carneades or APSICf+ and then applied to display-1180
ing the pro–contra structure of the argumentation using argument maps applied to1181
legal cases. To this purpose, we have analyzed the most common types of statutory1182
arguments and brought to light their common characteristics. We have shown how1183
canons of interpretation can be translated into argumentation schemes, and we have1184
distinguished two general macrostructures of positive and negative, total and partial1185
canons, under which various types of schemes and rebuttals can be classified. This1186
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preliminary classification was then used for modeling the interpretive arguments1187
formally and integrating them into computational systems and argument maps.1188
The interpretive schemes can be applied initially when constructing an argument1189
diagram to get an overview of the sequence of argumentation in a case of contested1190
statutory interpretations. The schemes can be applied in order to help the argument1191
analyst convey an evidential summary showing how the subarguments fit together in1192
a lengthy sequence of argumentation in a case, as indicated in the main example of1193
the educational grants case. The next step is to zoom in on parts of the argumentation1194
sequence that pose a problemwhere critical questions need to be asked or refinements1195
need to be considered. Here, the critical questions can be applied in order to find1196
further weak points in an argument by bringing out implicit premises that may have1197
been overlooked and that could be questioned.1198
The function of the set of critical questionsmatching a scheme is to give the arguer1199
whowants to attack the prior argument some idea of the kinds of critical questions that1200
need to be asked in replying to it. Thus, the critical questions can offer guidance as to1201
where look for weak points that could be challenged. However, there are theoretical1202
issues of how to structure the critical questions. If critical questions can be modeled1203
in the argument diagrams as additional premises, ordinary premises, assumptions, or1204
exceptions such as done in Carneades or ASPIC+, they can be modeled in argument1205
maps as undercutting or rebutting counterarguments. The problem that always arises1206
in attempts to fit critical questions into argument diagrams in this manner is one1207
of burden of proof. Is merely asking a critical question enough to defeat a given1208
argument? Or should a critical question be taken to defeat the given argument only if1209
some evidence is given to back it up. Carneades or ASPIC+ provides a way of dealing1210
with this problem that has been shown to be applicable to interpretative schemes.1211
The danger with using such schemes to construct hypotheses about the best inter-1212
pretation is one of jumping to a conclusion too quickly. This danger can be overcome1213
by asking critical questions matching the scheme and by considering possible objec-1214
tions to the argument fitting an interpretive scheme. For as we have seen in the1215
example, a sequence of argumentation based on the application of interpretive argu-1216
mentation schemes is defeasible and can be attacked by undercutters and rebutters1217
in an opposed sequence of argumentation. Indeed, it is this very situation of one1218
sequence of interpretive argumentation being used to attack another one that is char-1219
acteristic of the example we studied, a standard example of statutory interpretation.1220
We have also provided a fresh logical formalization of reasoning with interpretive1221
canons. Rather than modeling interpretive conclusion as deontic claims, as we did1222
in Sartor et al. (2014), here we have modeled them as conceptual (terminological)1223
claims concerning best interpretations.1224
We have then considered how interpretive arguments can be framed within argu-1225
mentation systems, includingdefeasible and strict rules.Wehave argued that a seman-1226
tics based on preferred extensions can provide an appropriate approach to interpre-1227
tive conclusions and can be used to distinguish between defensible and justifiable1228
interpretive claims. Regarding justification, we have argued for weak justifiability1229
(derivation in all extensions, also through different argument) to be more appropriate1230
to interpretive reasoning in legal contexts.1231
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This work still is quite preliminary, but necessarily so, since AI and law research1232
has neglected issues pertaining to statutory interpretation and more generally the1233
issue of determining the correct meaning of authoritative sources of the law. Fur-1234
ther research should include a more refined classification system for interpretative1235
schemes. Also, the idea of merging argumentation with deontic logic as advanced1236
in Sartor et al. (2014), Walton et al. (2014) needs to be reconsidered and integrated1237
with the different framework presented in this chapter.1238
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